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Abstract: 
This paper discusses the distinction between fact and opinion within the defence of 
honest opinion. It is argued that the classic legal tests for determining that distinction 
are largely unhelpful and produce unpredictable results, which trigger a chilling 
effect on speech. This paper advocates for an adaptation of the four-factor totality of 
circumstances test, established in Ollman v Evans 750 F 2d 970 (DC Cir 1984), to be 
inserted into the New Zealand Defamation Act 1992. This would provide more clarity, 
consistency and predictability for the defence of honest opinion in New Zealand, 
thereby better supporting freedom of expression under s14 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. 
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I Introduction 
The common law defence of honest opinion to defamation proceedings provides a 
bulwark for one of society’s most salient rights: freedom of expression. Whether a 
statement is held to be an opinion or a fact can make the difference between the 
defendant winning or having to pay damages. However, courts throughout the 
common law jurisdictions battle with the distinction. So murky and contentious is this 
boundary that it often seems that the only way to know if a statement is defamatory is 
to send it through the legal machine of the courts and see what emerges. The results 
can be baffling. In one case it was held defamatory to call someone “hideously ugly”,1 
in another for a food critic to describe the food as “inedible”.2 In both instances the 
communicators felt they were simply voicing their opinions and should be free to do 
so. This uncertainty in the law can cause people to check themselves to such an extent 
that free speech is hindered. The United Kingdom Court of Appeal recently widened 
the concept of opinion, stating that the lower court’s ruling against the defendant had 
“most certainly had a chilling effect on public debate”.3 
 
This paper will argue that the current methods determining a dividing line between 
fact and opinion are unworkable because no bright-line exists. After a summary of the 
law surrounding the defence of honest opinion, the rationale behind protecting 
opinion is discussed. The article then looks at the inadequacy of the fact-opinion 
distinction and its inability to support that rationale. Finally, after a survey of some 
current legal tests, a more flexible and predictable eight-factor test is proposed to 
address the dichotomy and better support free speech. 
 
II The Law of Honest Opinion 
The law of defamation aims to vindicate and prevent unjustified damage to 
reputations. In New Zealand, this endeavour comes by way of the common law and 
supported by the Defamation Act 1992. While the statute does not supply a definition, 
the words of Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch describe a defamatory statement as one that 
has a tendency to lower a person “in the estimation of right-thinking members of 
society generally”.4 To help provide a balance protecting free speech, the Defamation 
Act is furnished with four defences: truth, honest opinion, and absolute and qualified 
privilege.5 The first two are relevant for the purposes of this paper. The truth defence 
is available where the defendant has made a factual statement that he can prove true. 
The defence of honest opinion requires greater explanation. In essence, this defence 
  
1 Berkoff v Burchill and Another [1997] EMLR 139. 
2
 John Martin “The Blue Angel Defamation Trial” (1989) 11 Gazette of Law & Journalism 13.  
3 British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350, [2011] 1 WLR 133 at [11]. 
4 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240. 
5 Defamation Act 1992, ss 8, 9-12, 13-15, 16-19. 
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protects an individual's ability to voice their opinions. While some courts argue that 
opinions should be protected because they are not defamatory,6 the English treatise, 
Gatley on Libel and Slander, considers it better to view opinion statements as 
defamatory but not actionable.7 This defence is subject to three limitations: 
 
A The Opinion Must Be Genuine 
Under section 10 of the Defamation Act 1992, the genuineness of the opinion is 
paramount. While a factual statement is objectively determined to be true or false, a 
defendant’s genuine belief in their statement is a subjective test, concerned with his 
state of mind.8 The question the courts ask is whether any man could honestly hold 
the views and express the opinion on those facts.9 This test is one of honesty, not of 
reasonableness.10 Thus, the question is not whether one agrees with the comment. The 
commentator may be prone to exaggeration or have obstinate, even prejudicial 
views.11 This will not in itself defeat the defence. Furthermore, proof of actual malice 
is not an exception to honesty.12 However, if sheer invective is used, this may be 
“compelling evidence” of a lack of genuine belief in the opinion.13 In addition, public 
interest is no longer a requirement.14 While important to note the element of honesty, 
it is the following two limitations that this paper is primarily concerned with.  
 
B The Opinion Must Be Clearly Opinion 
If the statement is a fact, the defence of honest opinion will not be available. Opinion 
has been described as “something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a 
deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc”.15 It must be 
obvious to the reader16 that the statement is an opinion17 but distinguishing between 
  
6 Campbell v Spottiswoode (1863) 3 B & S 769; Minister of Justice v SA Associated Newspapers (1979) 
3 SA 466.  
7 Patrick Milmo and W V H Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2008) at 12.1. 
8 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) 
at 3.2.3. 
9 At 3.2.3, citing Lord Diplock Associated Newspapers v Burstein [2007] EWCA Civ 600, [2007] 4 All 
ER 319 at [519]-[520]. 
10 Mitchell v Sprott [2002] 1 NZLR 766 at [24]. 
11
 Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275 at 281; Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 2 All 
ER 516 at 520; Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [24]. 
12 Defamation Act 1992, s 12. 
13
 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2000] HKCFA 86, [2001] EMLR 31 at [57]. 
14
 Awa v Independent Newspapers Ltd [1997] 3 NZLR 590 at 595. 
15
 Clarke v Norton [1910] VLR 494 at 499. 
16
 References in this paper to ‘reader’, assume ‘listener’ as well.  
17
 Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.2; see also, Hunt v Star Newspaper 
Co Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309 at 319. 
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fact and opinion can be difficult. Currently, New Zealand courts often consider the 
contextual background of the statement to tell them how that statement would likely 
be interpreted:18 
 
Presentation is crucial to whether a statement is or is not an expression of 
opinion.  
… 
The defence applies when the words appear to a reasonable reader to be 
conclusionary. 
 
Similarly, courts in the United Kingdom often distinguish fact from opinion by a 
contextual analysis looking through the “prism of the reader”.19 An unclear statement 
may simply be treated as if it were a fact.20 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer identify 
some types of statements that can cause difficulties, including: those that mix together 
facts and opinion such that the opinion cannot be separated out, those that appear as 
fact but are conclusions inferred from facts, and those that appear as opinions but are 
not supported by any facts.21 
 
C The Opinion Must Be Based On a Substratum of Facts 
Two conditions must exist for this element to be met. First, unless they are common 
knowledge, the facts on which the opinion is based must be stated. In this way, the 
reader can consider the communicator’s opinion and compare it against his own.22 In 
Tse Wai Chun v Cheng, Lord Nicholls established that the supporting facts must be 
sufficient for the reader to “judge for himself how far the comment was well 
founded”.23 This test has now been altered to “whether the reader can recognise that 
what is being stated is comment”.24 
 
The facts set out need not be the entire facts, or else a theatre reviewer, for instance, 
would need to set out the entire script of a play.25 The subject matter need only be 
“indicated with sufficient clarity to justify the comment being made”.26 If the facts on 
  
18
 Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [18-19]; Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, 
at 3.2.2. 
19
 Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 at 855.  
20 At 855. 
21
 See Part III Inadequacy. 
22
 Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.1(a). 
23
 Tse Wai Chun v Cheng [2000] HKCFA 86, [2001] EMLR 31 at [19]. 
24
 Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.8, discussing the test from Lowe v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 320 QB, [2007] QB 580. 
25
 Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd  (1942) 42 SRNSW 171 at 179. 
26
 Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.1(a); Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 
345 at 347. 
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which the opinion is based are common knowledge, the reader will be able to 
determine if the opinion is justified without those facts being stated.  
 
Second, the facts on which the opinion is based must be “proved true or not materially 
different from the truth”.27 Two exceptions to this condition exist.28 If false facts are 
protected by privilege, then they may still support an honest opinion defence. 
Furthermore, if there are enough true facts stated or common knowledge to justify the 
opinion then not all facts supporting the opinion need to be true.  
 
The defendant’s state of mind is relevant, as he “cannot rely on as support of his 
opinion any facts not in existence when it was made or of which he was not aware”.29  
 
This final limitation is closely connected with the earlier aim in assisting a reader to 
recognise a statement as opinion. With a substratum of facts set out, a statement will 
appear to the reader more like an opinion. 
 
D New Zealand and United Kingdom Comparison 
While New Zealand defamation law regularly draws on law from the United 
Kingdom, there have been, and are, some important differences. Prior to the 
enactment of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK), the defence of honest opinion was 
called ‘honest comment’.30 Public interest was a requirement under that defence. The 
new act removes the public interest requirement and introduces a serious harm 
threshold, whereby the statement must meet that threshold before a claim for 
defamation can be brought to the courts. This raises the bar for claimants.31 Notably, 
privilege is extended to include peer-reviewed scientific and academic journals.32  
 
III Rationale Behind the Honest Opinion Defence 
The protection of honest opinion is a mainstay of freedom of expression. It is the 
“right of the citizen to express his genuine opinion… however wrong or exaggerated 
  
27
 Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [22]; Defamation Act 1992, s 11(a). 
28 Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.1(b). 
29
 Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.3. But see, Defamation Act 2013 
(UK), s 3(4); Timothy Pinto “Defamation Act 2013: A boost for free speech – Part 1: Serious 
Harm, Truth and Honest Opinion” (2013) Inforrm’s Blog: The International Forum for Responsible 
Media Blog <inforrm.wordpress.com>. 
30
 Joseph v Spiller, above n 19, at [117]. For purposes of this paper, which looks to various 
jurisdictions, the terms ‘fair comment’ and ‘honest opinion’ will be used interchangeably. But see, 
Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.6 for discussion regarding 
different implications of each term. 
31
 Defamation Act 2013 (UK) (explanatory notes) at 11.  
32
 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 6. 
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or prejudiced that opinion may be”.33 This defence supports overlapping arguments 
for freedom of expression, such as the search for truth, self-governance and the 
autonomy of the individual. In New Zealand, the right to free speech is embodied in 
section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It endorses “the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form”.34 Under 
section 5, this freedom is subject to reasonable limitations “demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.”35  
 
A Marketplace of Ideas 
Safeguarding genuine opinions captures one of the key purposes behind free speech, 
namely to create a marketplace of ideas.36 These types of statements “support an 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by people”37 and, thus, are in the public interest.38 As Justice Learned Hand 
remarked, “the right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of 
tongues”.39 Notwithstanding the aim of ‘right conclusions’, unpopular views can 
provide a useful backboard against which debate can arise. As such, the defence of 
honest opinion protects obstinate, exaggerated, even prejudiced views. The courts do 
not judge the reasonableness of the opinion.40  
 
Similar to obstinate and prejudicial views, arguably false facts too have a purpose in 
society. They provide the stepping stones for discovery by stimulating debate in 
bringing about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error’”.41 Dealing with the facts that underlie ideas, even if they are 
false, “bears a proportionate relationship” to the freedom to discuss those ideas.42  
 
However, false facts that damage reputation may cross the line from the protection of 
section 14 into the realm of section 5. As such, the purpose behind free speech is often 
better supported by being balanced with the protection of reputation.43 Without that 
  
33
 Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343 at 357. See also, Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323 
(1974) at 339. 
34
 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
35 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
36
 David Bromwich and George Kateb (eds) John Stuart Mill: On Liberty (Vali-Ballou Press, New 
York, 2003) at 118. 
37
 Roth v United States 347 US 476 (1957) at 484. 
38
 Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] KB 746 at 752. 
39 United States v Associated Press 52 F Supp 362 (SD NY 1943) at 372. 
40
 Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10. 
41
 New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) at 279, n 19. 
42 Frederick Schauer “Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry 
Canter” (1978) 64 VaLRev 263 at 273. 
43
 Ollman v Evans 750 F 2d 970 (DC Cir 1984) at 974. 
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balance, “a newspaper just as easily could call a candidate a rapist, an axe-murderer, 
or an ivory-billed woodpecker.”44 Ignoring the balance risks “protecting too much 
inaccurate and harmful reporting”.45 A society soaked in erroneous and destructive 
information risks stalling a productive exchange of ideas. Accordingly, the limitation 
put on false facts that damage reputation is usually justified in a free and democratic 
society.  
 
B Scientific Progress 
Within the scope of the marketplace-of-ideas lies the significance of promoting debate 
and the exchange of ideas within the fields of science and medicine. In the recent case 
of British Chiropractic Association v Singh, science was touted as a sector where 
opinion should be especially protected.46 Dr Singh had written an article in The 
Guardian’s ‘Comment and Debate’ page criticising the British Chiropractic 
Association. It alleged that the BCA “happily promoted bogus treatments” and did so 
without there being “a jot of evidence” to support the effectiveness of those 
treatments.47 Eady J in the High Court ruled that the allegations were plainly “a matter 
of verifiable fact”.48 The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, noting that the High 
Court ruling had “most certainly had a chilling effect on public debate which might 
otherwise have assisted potential patients to make informed choices about the possible 
use of chiropractic”.49  
 
C Counter-Balance for Absolute and Qualified Privilege 
The protection of opinion provides a balance to the privileges accorded public 
officials in regards to statements made in their official duties.50 These privileges allow 
them to “speak freely without fear that what they say will later be held against them in 
the Courts”.51 However, without the equivalent freedom to voice opinions, public 
officials would have an “unjustified preference over the public they serve”.52 As 
Justice Brennan observed, “analogous considerations support the privilege for the 
citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticise as it is the official’s 
  
44 Schauer “Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter”, above 
n 42, at 289. 
45
 Abner Mivka “In My Opinion, Those Are Not Facts” (1995) 11 GaStULRev 291 at 299. 
46
 Singh, above n 3. 
47 At [1]. 
48
 At [14]. 
49 At [11]. 
50
 Jeffrey Kirchmeier “The Illusion of the Fact-Opinion Distinction in Defamation Law” (1989) 39 
CaseWResLRev 867 at 872. 
51
 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 1 at 8. 
52
 Sullivan, above n 41, at 282-283. 
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duty to administer.”53 Thus, the defence of honest opinion acts as a “brake on the 
abuse of power by public officials,”54 and exposes individuals to a variety of beliefs, 
which they then can convey back to the government. 
 
D Alleviating the Strictness of the Defence of Truth 
The defence of truth55 protects the defendant from being sued if the imputations 
contained in the statements complained of were “true or not materially different from 
the truth” or if “the publication taken as a whole was in substance true, or was in 
substance not materially different from the truth”.56 Although a true statement may 
still lower a person in the estimation of others, the reason for the truth defence is that 
it entitles a person “only to the reputation his or her behaviour deserves”.57  
 
Nevertheless, the uncertainty of being able to prove the truth of a statement to a high 
enough degree to satisfy the courts raises concerns of self-censorship.58 As a result, 
false statements may be deterred but also true ones and opinions. This chilling effect 
on free speech "dampens the vigour and limits the variety of debate".59 
 
Without the defence of honest opinion to alleviate it, the truth defence is 
unsatisfactory and harsh. Justification applies to facts or opinions.60 However, 
subjecting opinion to the same standard of proof as fact would be “a significant 
inhibition on free speech”.61 Potential critics may hold themselves only to the 'safest' 
of statements in order to avoid harsh penalties. This risks hindering valuable 
discussion and criticism through concerns that statements may not "survive the court 
test of ‘truth’ even when [there were] reasonable grounds to believe them to be 
accurate".62 The defence of honest opinion then softens the burden of proving truth 
and encourages discussion and debate.63  
 
  
53 At 282. 
54
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328 at 337. 
55
 Also, ‘justification’. See Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.3. 
56
 Defamation Act 1992, s 8. 
57
 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer “Defamation” in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New 
Zealand (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) 16 at 16.9. 
58
 Sullivan, above n 41, at 279. 
59
 At 279. 
60 Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.3. 
61 Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.3. 
62 Herbert Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair 
Comment” (1962) 15 VandLRev 1203 at 1209. 
63 At 1209. 
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E Opinions are Less Damaging Than Fact 
Aside from the right of free speech, another basis behind honest opinion is the notion 
that “words which are clearly comment are likely to be treated with more caution by 
the reasonable reader and hence are less damaging than assertions of fact”.64 A reader 
will be more wary of an opinion statement since it leaves room for other possible 
conclusions. For example, ‘I saw Sam in the office looking around suspiciously. I 
think he took the money.’ There is latitude here for the reasonable reader to consider 
alternatives other than Sam being a thief. Thus, to support the basis of the honest 
opinion defence, John Burrows suggests a reader should be able to discern when an 
opinion is being made and “compare it with his or her own”.65    
 
With the purpose of protecting free speech and a belief that opinions are less 
damaging than fact, the common law courts search for a dividing line between fact 
and opinion to clarify the defence of honest opinion.  
 
IV Inadequacy of the Fact-Opinion Distinction 
As the concerns underlying the truth defence indicated, uncertainty in defamation law 
breeds self-censorship. Accordingly, to support the rationale behind the honest 
opinion defence, the law must provide clarity and predictability. While the three limbs 
of the defence, namely honesty, clear indication of opinion and a supplied substratum 
of facts, are in themselves fairly straightforward, their implementation has proven 
challenging. Most elusive has been distinguishing facts from opinion in order to 
determine if the second and third limb has been satisfied.  
 
A Inconsistency in the Courts 
Courts across the common law countries battle with this dichotomy, often resulting in 
split decisions or similar cases being decided very differently. In the United Kingdom 
case of Berkoff v Burchill, the defendant was a film critic writing for the Sunday 
Times. In one review, she wrote that “film directors from Hitchcock to Berkoff are 
notoriously hideous-looking people”.66 In another she wrote that the Frankenstein 
character in the film of the same name was “a lot like Stephen Berkoff, only 
marginally better-looking”.67 The Court of Appeal held this gave the impression that 
Mr Berkoff, a well-known actor, director and writer, was physically repulsive and 
that, since he was in the public eye and made his living partially as an actor, this 
meaning was “capable of lowering his standing in the estimation of the public and of 
  
64 Mitchell v Sprott, above n 10, at [17], citing Patrick Milmo and W V H Rodgers Gatley on Libel and 
Slander (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) at 12.7.  
65 Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.1(a). 
66 Berkoff, above n 1, at 141. 
67 At 141. 
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making him an object of ridicule”.68 In his dissenting judgment, however, Millet LJ 
reasoned that holding this statement as an actionable wrong would be “an 
unwarranted restriction on free speech”, asserting that “[p]eople must be allowed to 
poke fun at one another without fear of litigation”.69  
 
In 1984, Australian food critic Leo Schofield wrote a negative review of the Blue 
Angel Restaurant, published in the Good Living section of The Sydney Morning 
Herald.70  Schofield lamented that the lobster he had ordered was so appallingly 
overcooked that it was a “culinary crime” and “so crudely handled as to be, for this 
diner at least, almost inedible”.71 Schofield added that the menu noted a 45-minute 
wait time for the lobster. He went on to describe his lobster as, “cooked until every 
drop of juice and joy had been successfully eliminated” and that “the carbonised 
claws contained only a kind of white powder”.72  The plaintiffs complained of a 
number of imputations and to three of these Schofield pleaded fair comment. Mr 
Justice Enderby allowed the defence to go to trial for only one: the plaintiff “was a 
restauranteur that charged a price for excellent fresh lobster which when later cooked 
incompetently… did not then represent good value”.73 While the jury agreed that this 
imputation could be comment, they felt it was not based “on proper material for 
comment”.74 As a result, Schofield’s defence failed and Blue Angel and its proprietor 
were awarded a total of $100,000 in damages.75 
 
In London Artists v Littler76 and Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong,77 the facts were 
startlingly similar but contrastingly decided. In the former case, four actors, via 
identical letters, each gave notice they were leaving a production at the end of the 
month. The defendant published a letter noting their resignations and stating there was 
a plot by the four actors to end the running of the play. The statement complained of 
in London Artists was: “I am hurt that you did not see me before being a party to 
what, on the face of it, appears to be a plan to close the run of [the play].”78 The court 
held that this was stated as a fact. Similarly, in Jeyaretnam, the defendant spoke at a 
press conference, “I believe the exodus was engineered. I don’t think it was 
  
68
 At 151. 
69 At 153. 
70
 Martin “The Blue Angel Defamation Trial”, above n 2. 
71
 At 12.  
72
 At 12. 
73 At 13. 
74 At 14. 
75
 At 14. 
76 London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 All ER 193. 
77 Jeyaretnam v  Goh Chok Tong [1989] 1 WLR 1109. 
78
 London Artists Ltd, above n 76, at 195. 
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spontaneous.” This was based on an incident that occurred at the inauguration of a 
political party. After his speech, Mr Jeyaretnam suddenly left, followed by a walk-out 
by 200 members of the audience. The statements were regarded by the courts as 
opinion. 
 
B Underlying Problem 
Why then, when the 3 limbs of honest opinion seem straightforward enough, are the 
results so erratic? In the cases above, discussion centers on determining whether a 
statement or statements should be neatly placed in the ‘fact box’ or the ‘opinion box’. 
Ideally, a test that creates a bright-line between fact and opinion would provide the 
predictability and certainty that the rationale craves. Yet, this clear distinction 
continues to elude the courts.  
 
A bright-line distinction assumes that fact and opinion statements are opposites and 
therefore easily divided.79 In reality, no bright-line can be determined because the 
distinction is one of degree.80 As Robinson J noted, “fact is the germ of opinion”.81 
The procession from opinion to fact statements exists on a continuum with 
progressing degrees of specificity.82  
 
While every statement, no matter how specific, will be “in some measure the product 
of inference and reflection as well as observation and memory”,83 those at the extreme 
end of the spectrum contain the least amount. These statements deal with “one’s direct 
sensory perceptions” and will be viewed as “certain and true”.84 This is especially so 
with a statement that refers to a tangible object. This object “can be compared with 
the words used to see if there actually is a correspondence between the object and the 
words used to describe it.”85 To say that in the school dining hall is a table with four 
  
79
 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
above n 62, at 1222. 
80 Beech Aircraft Corp v Rainey 488 US 153 (1988) at 168.  
81 Ollman, above n 43, at 1021.  
82 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
above n 62, at 1222. 
83 E Cleary McCormick on Evidence (3rd ed, West Publishing, St Paul, MN,1984) at 27; Even facts 
themselves can be viewed as opinion statements that have been more specifically stated: see, Beech 
Aircraft Corp v Rainey, above n 80, at 168. Frederick Nietzsche maintained, “There are no facts, 
only interpretations.” (Frederick Nietzsche “Aus dem Nachlass der Achzigerjahr” in Werke III at 
903, cited by Charles Larmore The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996) at 81.) 
84
 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
above n 62, at 1222. 
85 Schauer “Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter”, above 
n 42, at 277. 
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legs can be resolved with a fair amount of confidence.86 This type of statement 
contains “virtually no inference, synthesis, or opinion”.87 For the sake of argument 
and the need to distinguish one end of the spectrum from another, comparing a 
statement to a physical object could be called a ‘pure fact’. Moving along the 
continuum, verifying a statement against established scientific principles, such as the 
detrimental physical effects of consuming large quantities of fast food, would be less 
precise but still well within the realm of general acceptance.88  
 
At the other end of the spectrum lie statements of ‘pure opinion’. These statements 
cannot be compared to objects that are observed or experienced through senses. They 
cannot even be verified against accepted criteria, since “the notion of confirming a 
statement purely of personal belief is nonsensical.”89 Often these statements will refer 
to the “existence of God or the nature of knowledge”90 or to matters of personal taste, 
political views or literary criticism. Sitting on the continuum just before these pure 
opinion statements are those Robinson J in Ollman v Evans referred to as “derogatory 
remarks [or]... expressions of generalised criticism or dislike without any specific 
factual moorings”.91 In this area would also fall metaphorical statements, which 
through context are clearly being used figuratively rather than literally.92 Robinson J 
provides an example where the plaintiff was said to “run a paper by paranoids for 
paranoids”.93 Read in context, the statement in that case was described as “obviously 
used … in a loose, figurative sense . . . [and could not] be construed as representations 
of fact”.94  
 
The fundamental problem with the fact-opinion distinction is that many statements 
fall somewhere on a continuum between strictly fact and strictly opinion. They often 
contain varying elements of fact, inference, reflection or emotion. It is in this mid-
range of the spectrum that the 3 types of statements mentioned earlier exist.95 
 
  
86
 NB: This paper does not delve into philosophical arguments as to the existence of matter. For this 
philosophical discussion, see: Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1959) at ch 2. 
87 Schauer “Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter”, above 
n 42, at 278. 
88 At 278. 
89 At 278. 
90 Michelle Sanders “The Fact/Opinion Distinction: An Analysis of the Subjectivity of Language and 
Law” (1987) 70 MarqLRev 673 at 680. 
91
 Ollman, above n 43, at 1021. 
92 At 1022. 
93 At 1022, citing Loeb v Globe Newspaper Co 489 F Supp 481 at 486 (1980). 
94 Loeb v Globe Newspaper Co 489 F Supp 481 at 486 (D Mass 1980). 
95 
“Law of Honest Opinion” section. 
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1 The Intermingled Statement 
An opinion statement that is not plainly separated from the facts surrounding it may 
be understood by the reader to be just another fact based on adequate grounds known 
to the writer.96 In the Canadian case of Mitchell, the Victoria Daily Times published 
an article imputing that the arrest of Mitchell solved the murder mystery of Molly 
Justice.97 It continued on to say that the police had looked for Mr Mitchell for a 
lengthy period and that he was brought in on a boy-sex charge which led to the 
“uncovering of Justice murder facts”.98 The only points made in the article which 
were actually true were that Mitchell was arrested and charged with murder and he 
had been booked on a boy-sex charge.99 The paper raised the defence of fair 
comment, applying it to the statements that could not be proven true.100 Bird J noted 
that while the article was a mixture of opinion and fact, it was not clear to him which 
statements were intended as which. Nor was it likely to be clear to the reasonable 
reader.101  
 
2 The Inference of Fact Statement 
While a statement that sets out a value-judgment may be apparent as opinion, one that 
“contains an inference of fact”102 may be more uncertain. This type of statement looks 
like a fact statement. However, it may be a fact stated as an “inference drawn by the 
writer from other facts” and would accordingly be treated like an opinion.103 Gatley 
on Libel and Slander gives the example: “Jones took a bribe.”104 If the writer had 
indicated in his article the events that led to this conclusion and indicated that this was 
his own personal conclusion, the defence may be available to him.  
 
3 The Bald Statement 
A ‘bald statement’, such as ‘X is dishonourable’, is one that does not identify the facts 
upon which it is based. Although it may look like an opinion, it will often be 
categorised as a fact because it gives no indication that it is a conclusion drawn from 
other facts. Without the facts to base the statement on, the reader would likely 
interpret it as a fact.105  However, some authorities are concerned that labeling bald 
  
96 Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.13. 
97
 Mitchell v Times Prinitng and Publishing Co Ltd (No 2) [1944] 1 WWR 400. 
98 At [1]. 
99
 At [16]. 
100
 At [17]. 
101 At [33]. 
102 Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.2. 
103
 Milmo and Rodgers Gatley on Libel and Slander, above n 7, at 12.6. 
104 At 12.6. 
105 Lowe v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 320 (QB). 
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statements as ‘fact’ may be misleading.106 Lord Phillips suggests this type of 
statement is “a comment coupled with an allegation of unspecified conduct upon 
which the comment is based”.107  
 
C Supporting the Rationale 
The examples above indicate that the current method does not adequately support the 
rationale behind the honest opinion defence. First, there is a struggle to attain the 
predictability and certainty needed to prevent self-censorship.108 Reviewers may be 
reluctant to critique restaurants negatively for fear of spending the next eight years in 
court battles. Scientists may keep thoughts to themselves on new or contentious 
theories. Even a case decided in favour of the defendant can cause a chill on speech, 
especially if it has gone through several courts or was not decided unanimously.  
 
Second, the examples indicate that opinions are not necessarily less damaging than 
fact.109 This rationale is in itself problematic. Opinions play a powerful role in society. 
Some of the most significant events in people’s lives are based on opinions: marriage, 
choice of religion, choice of career, to name a few.110 Furthermore, suggesting that 
factual statements are more harmful ignores the point that often “facts by themselves 
are innocuous”.111 If, for example, Emma gets 1 minute 20 seconds in her 100m 
freestyle swim, this reflects nothing on its own. Without an opinion attached to it, 
there is no indication whether that is good or bad. Or if Jack buys wires and solder 
from the local hardware shop, this is simply a neutral statement. However, suggest he 
is there to get ingredients for a bomb and he could be in serious trouble.  
 
Some situations can generate opinions that have a ruinous impact. Consider the 
communicator: “Identical words, in the mouths of different persons, can carry a 
radically different weight”.112 For instance, some statements made by socially weak 
groups can be ineffective in contrast with statements made by more powerful ones.113 
The effect a statement will have can depend on how favourably disposed an audience 
  
106 Joseph v Spiller, above n 19, at [5], per Lord Phillips; Burrows and Cheer Media Law in New 
Zealand, above n 8, at 3.2.2, n 412. 
107
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108
 Eric Barendt, Laurence Lustgarten, Kenneth Norrie and Hugh Stephenson Libel and the Media: The 
Chilling Effect (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) at 190. 
109
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110
 Jerry Phillips “Opinion and Defamation: The Camel in the Tent” (1990) 57 TennLRev 647 at 656. 
111
 At 669. 
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113 At 1306. 
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is towards the communicator.114 Along that same vein, an opinion made by someone 
highly respected or with expertise, such as a doctor or lawyer, can notably influence 
others.  
 
Another consideration is the person about whom the communication is being made. In 
the case of Gacic v Fairfax, a food critic reviewed an extremely high-end and 
expensive restaurant.115 Those eating there would expect near-perfection. The review 
described the food as “unpalatable”.116 This could cause many readers to shun the 
restaurant. When paying for expensive food, readers are less likely to want to risk 
getting an unpalatable meal.  
 
V Current Tests 
The struggle for clarity and predictability has led to much discussion across the 
common law countries regarding tests to distinguish fact from opinion.    
 
A Perception of the Reader Test 
As noted earlier, New Zealand and the United Kingdom view the statement from the 
perception of the reasonable reader and consider varying factors as to the context in 
which it was stated. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted a similar test: “What is 
comment and what is fact must be determined from the perspective of a ‘reasonable 
viewer or reader’”.117  
 
However, this test has not defined what a ‘fact’ or ‘opinion’ statement is.118 Saying 
that the statement is an opinion if it is read as an opinion is circular.119 The terms 
‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ are used so vaguely that nearly any conclusion sought could be 
made to fit.120 On its own, the test becomes self-justifying and thus, neither helpful 
nor predictable. 
 
  
114 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
above n 62, at 1212. 
115
 Gacic v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 362. 
116 Matthew Evans “Crash and Burn: When dining on the view is the only recommendation” The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Australia, 30 Sept 2003) at 6 Good Living. 
117 WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson [2008] 2 SCR 420, 2008 SCC 40 at [27]. 
118 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
above n 62, at 1205. 
119 Jeffrey Thomas “Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and the First Amendment” (1986) 74 
CalLRev 1001 at 1011, n 69. 
120
 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
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A survey of the United States courts yields more variety and discourse surrounding 
the debate. Two tests emerge with frequency: the Verifiability Test and the Totality of 
Circumstances Test. 
 
B Verifiability Test 
The Verifiability Test attempts to find the distinction between actionable and 
protected statements by first assessing whether the statement has a “generally 
accepted core of meaning”.121 If it does, then the question is asked whether the 
statement is capable of proof or disproof by an objective standard. One that is capable 
of that proof will be considered a ‘factual statement’.122 The reasoning is that if a 
statement is not verifiable, it cannot be considered to convey actual facts and thus, 
cannot be actionable in defamation because of constitutional protections of 
opinions.123  
 
In some instances the verifiability test is used as an alternative to distinguishing fact 
from opinion.124 The Supreme Court in the United States concluded that protecting 
free speech can be accomplished “without the creation of an artificial dichotomy 
between ‘opinion’ and fact”.125 In Milkovich, the majority held that statements must 
be “provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law”.126 Mr 
Milkovich was a high-school wrestling coach in Ohio. During a home match a fight 
broke out, causing Milkovich’s team to be put on probation by the Ohio High School 
Athletic Association (OHSAA). Several parents sued the OHSAA. The Court of 
Common Pleas overturned the probation. Mr Diadiun wrote in his News Herald 
article, “Anyone who attended the meet... knows in his heart that Milkovich... lied at 
the [Court of Common Pleas] hearing after... having given his solemn oath to tell the 
truth.”127 Mr Milkovich sued, alleging the statement that he had committed perjury 
was defamatory.  
 
The majority held that because Mr Milkovich’s testimony before the OHSAA and his 
testimony before the trial court could be compared, the statement was “sufficiently 
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false”.128 While Brennan and 
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Marshall JJ agreed with the majority’s theory, they disagreed with its application. In 
looking at the context of the News Herald article, they found the statements could not 
imply, as a verifiable fact, “that Milkovich had perjured himself”.129 Whether the 
verifiability test is perceived as a method of distinguishing fact from opinion or 
whether it is a separate test to indicate a statement as an actionable wrong, the test 
creates the same issues of uncertainty as the Perception of the Reader test.  
 
Many statements do not “divide neatly into categories of ‘verifiable’ and 
‘unverifiable’”.130 Most statements will fall somewhere along a spectrum of differing 
degrees of verifiability.131 The more verifiable a statement is, the “more confident the 
determinations of truth”.132 For example, a statement that one owns a home in New 
Zealand is verifiable, whereas a statement that ‘X is frightening’ is not. One can be 
more confident of the truth of the former statement than the latter. While being critical 
of an over reliance on this test, some courts have acknowledged its limited usefulness, 
as a “minimum-threshold issue”.133 As with pure opinion statements, the test may be 
helpful in recognising where a statement sits at the extreme ends of the continuum.  
 
The marketplace-of-ideas metaphor, which underlies arguments for free speech and 
the defence of honest opinion, relies on the ideas brought forward in John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty.134 Ironically, the reason Mill felt opinions should be protected was 
not because of their inability to be verified but rather because since they could often 
be proven true, they have a valuable place in society. Even partially true opinions 
could lead to important discussion and clashes of opinion, allowing “the remainder of 
the truth… any chance of being supplied” 135 
 
Another difficulty emerges when the test is used on its own. For example, consider a 
restaurant review that states, “The green peppers… remained frozen on the plate.”136 
While this could be proven true or false, because it is in a restaurant review, the reader 
is most likely to understand it as an opinion.137 As a single inquiry, verifiability may 
yield one result but when the scope of the test is widened to include context, another 
  
129 At 2711. 
130 Ollman, above n 43, at 982. 
131
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determination often results. This recognises that the “meaning of words vary 
depending on the immediate context of the words and the social setting of the 
statement”.138 Some courts have opted to use this test in combination with other tests. 
 
C Totality of Circumstances Test 
One court that did so was the court in Ollman v Evans.139 There the court developed 
the four-factor ‘totality of circumstances’ test to determine if a statement was an 
actionable fact or a protected opinion. The first factor determines whether the 
statement has a precise commonly understood meaning that gives rise to factual 
implications. The second looks at whether the statement is verifiable. The third and 
fourth factors look to context, namely the immediate context in which the statement 
occurs and the broader social context surrounding the statement.  
 
The development of a test with factors that look to the statement itself and the context 
within which it sits provides some structure for courts to follow and retains the 
flexibility needed to analyse different types of statements and situations. However, 
even within Ollman there was disagreement with the test’s application. Once again, 
despite applying the same test, the court was split as to whether that test revealed the 
statements as fact or opinion. Differing views on what was contextually relevant and 
how much weight should be given to those factors caused some of the divide.140 
Additionally, Wald J in his dissent felt that the statement in that case yielded a precise 
commonly understood meaning that could be verified.141  
 
The United States Supreme Court in Milkovich superseded Ollman. By ignoring the 
context factors from Court of Appeal’s test, the Supreme Court looked at statements 
in their literal form.142 This is less ideal in that it makes the defence harder to obtain 
and does not recognise the reader’s ability to interpret a statement as an opinion based 
on its contextual environment.143 It also is undesirable to ignore the environment in 
which the statement exists as this can lead to an artificial determination of fact or 
  
138 Becker “Structuring Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion Determination: A Critique of 
Ollman v Evans”, above n 123, at 925. 
139
 Ollman, above n 43. 
140 At 1034, per Wald J: “[T]he immediate context in which this statement was made does little to warn 
a reader to regard with scepticism what might otherwise appear to be an assertion of fact”.  
141 At 1032. 
142 Milkovich, above n 125, at 21; Margaret Chan “Importance of a Contextual Approach to Libel Law: 
The Impact of Immuno AG v Moor-Jankowski and Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co” (1993) 9 Touro 
Law Rev 611 at 618. 
143
 Milkovich, above n 125, at 18; Nancy K Bowman “Milkovich Meets Modern Federalism in Libel 
Law: The Lost Opinion Privilege Gives Birth to Enhanced State Constitutional Protection” (1993) 
42 DePaul Law Review 583 at 585.  
  
 
20
opinion. Dissatisfaction with the Milkovich test is most evident in the case of 
Moldea,144 which initially followed Milkovich. Just 3 months later, in a unique 
turnabout, the same panel of Court of Appeal judges reversed its decision, stating that 
context was a critical consideration.145  
 
D Further Inconsistency in the Courts 
While contextual factors are sometimes considered in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand courts, they are not done so consistently nor are the same factors considered 
across all cases. For example, in London Artists, the court felt the use of cautionary 
language was not strong enough to convey the statements as opinion.146 By contrast, 
in Jeyaretnam, the statement, “I am inclined to believe”, was instrumental in the 
Court of Appeal deciding that the statements were opinion. That judgment did not 
reflect on the fact that the statement was made in a press conference, which could 
suggest a vessel for imparting news and facts rather than opinions.147 
 
To most, a value-judgment regarding someone’s appearance is likely to fall on the 
extreme opinion end of the spectrum. In Berkhoff, the majority ignored any possibility 
that the statement implying Berkhoff was hideously ugly was an opinion. However, 
Millet J, in his dissent, considered the contextual factor that the author was writing in 
her role as a film critic, allowing for the statement to be understood as a humorous 
exaggeration.148 
 
In Singh, the fact that the statements made were of a scientific or medical nature 
influenced the Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court decision and rule in favour 
of the defendant.149 
 
Hence, different cases regard different factors when assessing whether a statement is a 
fact or opinion.150 The result is an inconsistent and unpredictable defence that risks 
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courts picking and choosing the factors to accord with a desired outcome and 
arguably infringes upon the rationale behind the defence.  
 
VI  Solution 
One of the difficulties with the Ollman test may be that the four factors are still too 
general. Determining what should be considered within each factor and the weight it 
should carry becomes “largely subjective”.151 It is likely that no one test could be 
created that would definitively discern a fact from opinion in each of the infinite 
possible scenarios. However, the Ollman test is a strong contender and can be used to 
supply a framework for a more specific set of factors. These would provide more 
clarity, predictability and consistency for the defence of honest opinion in New 
Zealand.152 Notably, many of these factors have been considered at one time or 
another in various judgments in the United Kingdom and New Zealand but rarely in 
their entirety and often erratically. The proposed eight-factor test would also widen 
the availability of the defence, thus better supporting freedom of expression in 
accordance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
 
The proposed test would seek to answer an overarching question similar to that 
already asked by New Zealand courts:  
 
“Is the statement presented in such a way that the reasonable reader would recognise 
it as an opinion?” 
 
While the question by itself is circular, a series of factors would in most 
circumstances guide the courts to an answer by helping them ascertain where on the 
spectrum of fact-opinion the statement lies. The first two factors look to the statement 
itself: 
 
1 Common usage 
Is the statement one that has a precise commonly understood meaning?153  
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This factor gives the court a starting point on the fact-opinion spectrum. As other 
factors are considered, the statement may be adjusted along the spectrum one way or 
another. 
 
Some statements are clearly understood as having one meaning and as such will carry 
factual implications. Saying someone is a thief would generally have one understood 
meaning: the person has stolen another’s property. However, a further look at other 
factors, such as the context that the statement is in, may expose a figurative meaning, 
indicating this particular statement may be understood by the reader as an opinion. 
 
2 Extent to which the statement is verifiable scientifically 
While Ollman’s second factor is one of verifiability, the concern is that this factor 
increases uncertainty. As stated above, verifiability can be difficult to determine and 
is often a subjective determination. Indeed, two judges applying the same 4-factor test 
in Ollman came to opposite results because of differing views on the verifiability of 
part of the statement.154  
 
Changing this factor to look at the extent that a statement is provable recognises the 
spectrum of verifiability mentioned earlier. This allows for a determination by degree. 
The greater the extent to which the statement is verifiable, the more likely, in light of 
the other factors, that it is a factual statement.  
 
 
In recognising a statement to be a fact or opinion, “[r]eaders will inevitably be 
influenced by a statement’s context”.155 The remaining factors look to the context of 
the statement. 
3 Extent to which, if the statement is not verifiable scientifically, it is comparable 
against an implicit or explicit societal standard 
Inherent in opinion statements is that they are some form of evaluative judgment, 
whether a conclusion, justification or even an observation, which is held by the 
communicator to some standard. If that standard is evident or is made evident, then 
this may further indicate an opinion.156  
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A standard may be evident if the communicator provides information as to why they 
are making the statement. This is closely linked to providing a substratum of facts. A 
test that encourages the communicator of an opinion to explain why he or she is 
coming to that conclusion will do two things: first, make it clearer that the statement 
is an opinion and second, allow readers to decide if they agree or disagree with the 
statement. The latter effect goes to the heart of the defence. If a reader understands 
clearly that she could disagree with the statement, that statement will encourage 
debate and discussion and thus should be protected. 
 
Additionally, an indication of a unique standard, whether implicit or explicit, may 
suggest an opinion. For example, the statement, 'Jones is an alcoholic' on its own may 
give the impression of a fact. However, if the reader is imparted with information 
indicating that the communicator vehemently considered all alcohol to be sinful and 
immoral, then that unique standard may indicate the statement to be an opinion.  
 
4 Language surrounding the statement 
Does the language surrounding the statement influence the way the statement is 
perceived? 
 
A statement, which viewed in a vacuum would appear as a fact, may give the 
perception of opinion when viewed in the context of the remaining article. For 
example, in the New Zealand case of Awa v Independent Newspapers Ltd, the term 
‘body-snatcher’ was used. The court in looking at the rest of the article held that 
'body-snatching' was not meant to suggest improper purpose or dishonesty but merely 
that the body was removed against the wishes of the widow.157  
 
5 Cautionary language 
While not definitive on its own,158 words such as ‘I believe’ or ‘In my opinion’ can 
provide an indication to the reader that the statement was intended as an opinion. 
 
6 Issues of public importance 
Public interest is not a requirement under the defence. However, certain speech should 
encourage courts to be more lenient towards determining a statement to be an opinion. 
Statements such as scientific, medical or political speech play an important role in the 
marketplace of ideas, for example. This is echoed in the aforementioned recent 
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changes to the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) and in the United Kingdom decision of 
Singh.159 
 
7 Location of article or discourse 
This factor looks to see if the statement is located in a context where rhetoric 
hyperbole would be expected. For example, in the United States Supreme Court case 
of Letter Carriers, the plaintiff was called a traitor. The court there reasoned that as 
this was in the course of labour disputes, this type of “exaggerated rhetoric was 
commonplace”.160 Additionally, if the article were contained in a ‘Comment’ section 
of the paper, it would be more likely to be perceived as containing opinion statements 
than one placed on the front page. 
 
8 Type of article or discourse 
Some types of articles clearly indicate that the opinion of the author is being set out, 
such as restaurant or film reviews. Communication in a press conference, for 
example, would be more likely to be understood as factual than that on a late night 
talk show.  
 
A Application 
Applying the test to the forms of statements and previous cases that were discussed 
earlier, demonstrates how the test will work. 
 
In Blue Angel, the statement that the lobster was ‘cooked incompetently’ could hold a 
range of meanings from clumsily handled to inexpert. Thus to begin, the statement is 
on the opinion end of the spectrum. The extent that the phrase, which is one 
describing personal taste, is unverifiable supports this placement on the spectrum. The 
third factor recognises the author as a food critic and as such may be presumed by the 
reader to have a well-developed palate and high standards. The reader would be more 
likely to interpret his statement as one which the reader could well have disagreed 
with if they had eaten the same meal. The article surrounding the statement describes 
Mr Schofield’s impressions of the rest of his meal. These are evaluative statements, 
which would further lend the statement complained of an impression of opinion. 
While no cautionary language is used in this statement nor is it regarding a scientific, 
medical or political issue, these factors are not strong enough to shift the statement 
from the opinion end of the spectrum. Finally, the article was located in the Good 
Living section of the Sydney Herald rather than being front-page news and was clearly 
a restaurant review. By addressing these factors, courts would likely come to the same 
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conclusion: the statement was presented in such as way that the reasonable reader 
would recognise it as opinion. 
 
The Berkhoff decision could have benefited from a set of factors to address. It is 
difficult to imagine a more obvious statement of opinion than an aesthetic evaluation. 
The term  
‘hideously ugly’ can carry a different meaning to each person and will fall on the 
extreme end of being unverifiable. Ms Burchill made the statement in her role as a 
film critic, adding an impression of opinion to an already personal viewpoint. 
Moreover, the words surrounding the statement were providing an opinion on films 
and their directors. The statement itself was clearly in the vein of a “humorously 
exaggerated observation”.161 
 
B  Implementation 
While courts have the ability, within the constraints of the legislation, to develop the 
common law by applying the proposed test, it would add consistency and 
predictability162 if it were inserted as a separate section into the Defamation Act 1992: 
 
9a Factors in determining opinion 
 
(1) In any proceedings for defamation in respect of matter that includes or consists of 
an expression of opinion, a defence of honest opinion by a defendant shall fail unless 
the defendant proves that the statement is presented in such a way that the reasonable 
reader would recognise it as opinion, having regard to the following factors – 
(a) Whether the statement has a commonly understood meaning indicating factual 
or evaluative implications; and 
(b) The extent to which the statement is verifiable scientifically; and 
(c) The extent to which, if the statement is not verifiable scientifically, it is 
comparable against an implicit or explicit standard; and 
(d) The extent to which the language around the statement influences the way the 
statement is perceived; and 
(e) The extent to which cautionary language is used; and 
(f) The extent to which the statement refers to issues of public importance; and 
(g) The location of the article or discourse; and 
(h) The type of article or discourse. 
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VII Further Considerations 
The focus of this paper is on securing a method that could better distinguish opinion 
from fact. However, another issue could be further explored within the defence. While 
a detailed investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, brief observations may be 
addressed.  
 
In 1962, Herbert Titus formed his own solution to the fact-opinion dichotomy.163 
While that solution is not directly adaptable to the modern New Zealand defence of 
honest opinion, the principles and philosophy behind it are informative. To indicate 
that his statement would not lower the plaintiff’s reputation without justification, 
Titus felt that the communicator must show he had taken reasonable care in gathering 
information about the plaintiff and that his statement was justifiable in light of those 
facts gathered.164 The reasonable care aspect embodies a principle of moral duty and 
responsibility to others within society.   
 
Given the potentially formidable power individuals have through online forums and 
other methods of instant global communication,165 consideration should be given in 
some way to the effect a statement will have on a given individual. A possible 
strategy could be to add a second limb to the proposed test, the purpose of which 
would be to focus on and encourage responsible communicating. This limb would 
recognise that opinion statements can, in some instances, cause more harm than 
factual ones. It could be assessed through a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act166 
inquiry: whether the harm that has resulted, or is likely to result, from the statement is 
a demonstrably justifiable reason to limit that statement.  
 
Some factors the limb could consider that may increase the harm a statement may 
cause include:  
(i) The probability that the statement has to mislead the reader: "Where that 
probability is high, a greater number of people will think worse of the plaintiff for 
reasons other than those which the defendant has relied upon".167 This would further 
look at the standards against which the statement was made. 
  
163 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
above n 62. 
164
 At 1228. 
165
 Twitter, for example, provides the perfect conditions for a heedless ‘140-characters-or-less’ 
comment to contact thousands of readers, who in turn pass it on to thousands of others. A plaintiff’s 
reputation can be destroyed in minutes. 
166
 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
167
 Titus “Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment”, 
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(ii) Potentially some of the same factors that are looked at in determining remedies 
could also be used in determining whether the harm done was enough to push the 
statement over the demonstrably justifiable threshold. For example, where the 
defendant has a great influence over the public or where the nature of the defamatory 
statement is a serious allegation, the harm will likely be greater.  
 
The challenge in implementing this second limb would be to not undermine the 
honest opinion defence by causing more uncertainty or by requiring such care be 
taken before any statement is made that it has a chilling effect on speech.  
 
VIII Conclusion 
 The unfeasible pursuit of a distinction between fact and opinion casts the law of 
defamation into a ‘chilling’ world of uncertainty. A society unable to understand and 
predict when they are free to speak their mind will create self-censorship, hindering 
the positive public interest effects of debate and discussion, as was seen in Singh.168 
The proposed test would more effectively provide foreseeable results for 
communicators while giving the courts a flexible approach that better reflects the 
fluidity of language and allows the defence to play its intended role as the hallmark of 
free speech.  
 
  
  
168
 Singh, above n 3, at [11]. 
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